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George Price (1922–1975; Figure 1) 
was an American scientist whose 
brief but productive career as an 
evolutionary theorist during the late 
1960s and early 1970s is one of the 
most fascinating episodes in the 
history of the discipline. Price trained 
as a chemist and had worked on the 
Manhattan Project before becoming  
a science writer. Self-funded by a 
large insurance settlement after 
a botched medical operation, he 
relocated to London at the end of 
1967 and began teaching himself the 
basics of evolutionary theory,  
working first in libraries and then at 
the Galton Laboratory at University 
College London. Bringing a fresh 
perspective to the discipline, 
Price discovered an entirely novel 
approach to population genetics, 
and the basis for a general theory of 
selection — the Price equation. Other 
accomplishments followed, but the 
period of discovery was cut tragically 
short by Price’s suicide, after which 
his name faded into obscurity. 
However, the Price equation has 
come to underpin several key 
areas of evolutionary theory, and is 
beginning to illuminate difficult issues 
in other disciplines.
The Price equation
The Price equation is a simple 
mathematical statement about 
change. In its usual formulation, it 
describes how the average value of 
any character — body weight, antler 
size, proclivity to altruism — changes 
in a biological population from one 
generation to the next. Price denoted 
the individual’s character value as z, 
its number of offspring as w, and the 
discrepancy between the character 
values of itself and its offspring as 
∆z, and showed that the change 
in the population average value of 
the character between parent and 
offspring generations is:
     ∆ z  = cov(w/w,z) + E((w/w )∆z) (1)
where overbars denote population 
averages (see Box 1 for a simple 
derivation).
Primer
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total change into two component 
parts. The first part is the change 
that can be ascribed to the action 
of selection, and this takes the form 
of a statistical covariance between 
individuals’ character values (z) and 
their relative reproductive success 
(w/w ). For example, if individuals 
with larger values of the character of 
interest tend to have more offspring, 
then the covariance is positive 
and selection acts to increase the 
population average value of the 
character. The remainder term 
takes the form of an expectation 
(arithmetic average) describing how 
offspring differ from their partners, 
and this is denoted the change due 
to transmission. If offspring are 
identical copies of their parents, then 
the transmission effect is zero and 
selection is the only factor involved 
in the evolution of the character. 
However, offspring will often differ 
from their parents, perhaps because 
of mutation, or because their genes 
are recombined in a new way, or 
because of a change in their physical, 
biological or cultural environment, and 
in this case the transmission effect is 
non-zero.
The importance of the Price 
equation lies in its scope of 
application. Although it has 
been introduced using biological 
terminology, the equation applies to 
any group of entities that undergoes 
a transformation. But despite its vast 
generality, it does have something 
interesting to say. It separates and 
neatly packages the change due to 
selection versus transmission, giving 
an explicit definition for each effect, 
and in doing so it provides the basis 
for a general theory of selection. In a 
letter to a friend, Price explained that 
his equation describes the selection 
of radio stations with the turning 
of a dial as readily as it describes 
biological evolution. Sadly, this 
general theory of selection remains 
undeveloped. Nevertheless, because 
of its generality and simplicity, 
Price’s equation has been used to 
uncover fundamental processes in 
evolution and, as a meta-model, it 
allows comparisons and contrasts to 
be drawn between different models 
and methodologies. As such, it is an 
important conceptual aid that has 
led to the discovery of unexpected 
connections between different bodies 
of theory, has settled long running controversies, and has helped to 
resolve semantic confusion. 
Darwinism
The Price equation has most 
frequently been applied to biological 
evolution, and equation (1) appears 
to capture the Darwinian idea of the 
‘survival of the fittest’. Transmission 
effects aside, selection operates 
to favour those characters that are 
positively correlated with individual 
reproductive success. However, the 
modern theory of natural selection is 
framed in terms of changes in gene 
frequencies, and Price formulated this 
by focusing on the additive genetic 
component (g) of the character, rather 
than the actual phenotypic value (z). 
Discarding the genetic change due to 
transmission, the Price equation can 
be used to provide a formal statement 
of natural selection:
   ∆sg = cov(w/w,g) = βw/w,g var(g). (2)
Price found it illuminating to express 
natural selection as a product of its 
component factors: the regression 
(slope) of relative reproductive 
success against the genetic value 
of the individual ( βw/w,g); and the 
genetic variation in the population 
(var(g)). This highlights the fact that 
natural selection operates when there 
are heritable differences between 
individuals with respect to some 
character that is correlated with 
reproductive success. Furthermore, 
because variances are never 
negative, any response to natural 
selection must be in the direction 
of increasing reproductive success 
(having the same sign as βw/w,g). The 
Price equation thereby captures the 
improving effect that natural selection 
has on biological populations.
Darwinism is a theory of the 
purpose as well as the process of 
adaptation. Darwin argued that 
because natural selection causes 
those characters that improve 
individual fitness to accumulate in 
biological populations, organisms 
will correspondingly appear as 
if designed to maximise their 
fitness. This appearance of design 
or agency makes biology unique 
among the natural sciences, and 
is the reason why the evolutionary 
literature abounds with intentional 
language — selfishness, strategies, 
conflicts of interest. But the issue 
of this almost magical appearance of agency has long been neglected 
by population geneticists, who have 
tended to obscure the role of the 
individual organism by focusing 
instead on genes and genotypes. 
Price’s equation, in contrast, 
highlights the individual and its 
fitness, and links this to changes 
in gene frequency. For this reason, 
evolutionary theorist Alan Grafen 
has used the Price equation to 
establish mathematical links between 
population genetics and optimisation 
theory that formally justify the view 
of individual organisms as economic, 
fitness-maximising agents. In 
capturing both the process and 
purpose of adaptation, the Price 
equation forms the mathematical 
foundations of Darwinism.
Social evolution
Darwin argued that individuals should 
be favoured to behave in ways that 
improve their personal reproductive 
success. However, altruistic behaviour 
is common in the natural world, and 
this is difficult to reconcile with ‘the 
survival of the fittest’. Recognising 
this problem, Darwin explained 
how certain characters could be 
favoured because they improve 
the reproductive success of one’s 
relatives (kin selection),  
or else because they provide an 
overall benefit to the social group 
Figure 1. George R. Price. 
Photograph taken in 1973. With thanks to 
Princeton University Press.
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equation provides the formal 
foundation of both kin selection and 
group selection theories (Box 2), 
and has clarified that these are not 
competing hypotheses but rather two 
different ways of looking at the very 
same evolutionary process.
The kin selection approach, 
developed by W.D. Hamilton in the 
1960s, takes the view that a gene can 
be favoured by natural selection by 
increasing the reproductive success 
of its bearer and also by increasing 
the reproductive success of other 
individuals that carry the same gene. 
All that matters is that the gene 
propels copies of itself into future 
generations — where these copies 
come from is irrelevant. The condition 
by which an altruistic (or indeed, any) 
behaviour is favoured by selection, 
termed Hamilton’s rule, is rb – c > 0, 
where c is the fitness cost to the actor, 
b is the fitness benefit to the recipient, 
and r is the genetic relatedness 
between actor and recipient. Thus, 
altruism is favoured provided the 
actor and recipient are sufficiently 
close relatives. The quantity rb – c 
has been termed the ‘inclusive 
fitness’ effect of the behaviour, and 
describes the actor’s impact on 
the reproductive success of all its 
relatives (including itself), weighted 
by the genetic relatedness of each. 
It is the inclusive fitness rather than 
the personal reproductive success 
of the actor that is maximised by 
natural selection. Hamilton’s rule was 
originally developed using a simplified 
population genetic model that made 
rather restrictive assumptions, and 
was long derided by population 
geneticists as being inexact and 
heuristic. However, Hamilton later 
provided a much neater proof of the 
rule using Price’s equation (Box 2), 
clarifying the definition of terms and 
demonstrating the rule’s generality. 
Many subsequent developments of 
kin selection theory have also used 
Price’s equation as their underlying 
basis.
An alternative view of social 
evolution suggests that selection 
operating to favour one social 
group over another can counteract 
selection operating within social 
groups, so that behaviours giving 
individuals a disadvantage relative 
to their social partners may evolve 
through group selection. Such ideas 
were rather confused until Price, 
and later Hamilton, showed that the 
Price equation can be expanded 
to encompass multiple levels of 
selection acting simultaneously 
(Box 2). This allows selection at 
the various levels to be explicitly 
defined and separated, and provides 
the formal basis of group selection 
theory. Importantly, it allows the 
quantification of these separate 
forces and yields precise predictions 
for when group-beneficial behaviour 
will be favoured. It turns out that 
these predictions are always 
consistent with Hamilton’s rule,  
rb – c > 0. Furthermore, because kin 
selection and group selection theory 
are both based upon the same Price 
equation, it is easy to show that the 
two approaches are mathematically 
exactly equivalent, and are simply 
alternative ways of carving up the 
total selection operating upon 
the social character. Irrespective 
of the approach taken, individual 
organisms are expected to maximise 
their inclusive fitness — though this 
result follows more easily from a kin 
selection analysis, as it makes the key 
element of relatedness more explicit.
Beyond evolutionary biology
It is historical accident that has led 
Price’s equation to be associated with 
Box 1.
Deriving the Price equation.
The Price equation is based on a mapping between individuals in parent and offspring 
generations; an example is given in the diagram below. Biological terms are used for 
concreteness, but the mapping applies to any groups of entities that undergo change. 
Each parent is assigned a unique index i, and it is mapped to wi offspring that are given 
the same index; wi can be regarded as the individual’s fitness. The proportion of the  
parental generation that is made up of the ith parent is qi — for example, qi = 1/n where 
n is the number of parents — and the proportion of the offspring generation that is 
made up of the offspring of the ith parent is qi´ = qiwi/w, where w is the average fitness 
of all the parents. Finally, the value of some character of interest is zi for the ith parent 
and the average value of this character among its off spring is zi´ = zi + ∆zi; ∆zi can be 
regarded as the change in character occurring through transmission from parent to 
 offspring. In the diagram, individuals exhibiting a character of interest (shaded) leave 
more offspring than individuals not exhibiting the character (unshaded). Also, whilst 
there is a tendency for offspring to resemble parents, this is not perfect.
2
3
1
4
4
1
1
4
Parents Offspring
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The Price equation describes the change in the average value of the character between 
the two generations. This is given by ∆zi = zi´ – zi, where zi´ and zi are the averages  
in the offspring and parent generations, respectively. Substituting in the notation  
introduced above obtains:
∆ = ∑ ′ ′ ∑ + ∆ −z z zi i i i i i i iq z q w w z z−  = /( )( )
and with some rearrangement this becomes:
∆ ∑ ∑ ∆z =  q w /w z z q w /w zi i i i i i i i( ) + ( )− .
The first two terms on the right-hand side represent the covariance between relative 
fitness and character value across individuals: cov(w/w,z) = E((w/w)z) – E(w/w)E(z), 
where E denotes an expectation taken across the population. When character value is 
independent of relative fitness, E((w/w)z) = E(w/w)E(z), and the covariance is zero. A 
positive correlation between character value and relative fitness gives a positive covari-
ance, and a negative correlation gives a negative covariance. The third term on the 
right-hand side is the average character change due to transmission between parent 
and offspring, weighted by parental fitness, and can be rewritten as E((w/w)∆z. This 
yields equation (1) in the main text — the Price equation.
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few years the equation has begun 
to make an appearance within other 
disciplines. Biologists Troy Day and 
Sylvain Gandon have recently applied 
the Price equation to epidemiology, in 
the context of the evolution of parasite 
virulence. Here, it has been useful 
for conceptualising and deepening 
the understanding of existing 
theoretical results. It also provides an 
avenue into a better understanding 
of the co- evolutionary arms races 
of parasites and their hosts, where 
natural selection leads to improvement 
of one species, which is undone by 
any improvement in its enemy. The 
net result of these forces can be 
difficult to understand when they are 
taken together, but the Price equation 
provides a means of separating them 
so that they can be considered, and 
understood, in isolation.
In the ecological literature, Price’s 
equation has provided insights into 
the impact of local extinctions on 
community productivity. There is 
some controversy over whether 
species richness per se is important, 
particularly when redundancy in 
function means that vacated niches 
can become occupied by other 
species that are already present 
in the community. Jeremy Fox has 
used the Price equation to separate 
the various causal factors that can 
give rise to community productivity 
effects, and to provide a meta- model 
which generalises and allows 
easy comparisons of the rather 
complicated and restrictive models 
that have been devised to address 
this problem.
What happened to Price?
Following the development of the 
Price equation, Price went on to make 
two other major contributions to 
evolutionary theory. The first of these 
was to formally prove and provide 
an interpretation for R.A. Fisher’s 
fundamental theorem of natural 
selection, a mathematical result that 
had perplexed population geneticists 
for decades. The theorem states 
that the change in the mean fitness 
of the population under the action 
of natural selection is proportional 
to the variance in fitness, and 
Fisher claimed that it captured the 
directional, improving action of natural 
selection as the builder of organismal 
adaptations. Price explained that 
Fisher’s theorem was a partial result, 
a description of the action of the 
natural selection effect with all other 
evolutionary effects stripped away, 
and the theorem is easily proven using 
the Price equation:
     ∆s w= cov(w/w,w) = var(w)/w  (3)
Price’s final contribution was the 
first explicit application of game 
theory to evolutionary biology, in a 
seminal article co-authored with John 
Maynard Smith entitled The Logic 
of Animal Conflict. This is widely 
regarded as one of the most important 
developments of evolutionary 
theory, and has launched a highly 
successful programme of research. 
It is Maynard Smith who is usually 
attributed with this breakthrough, and 
Box 2. 
Foundations of social evolution theory.
Hamilton’s rule of kin selection theory can be derived using the Price equation. From 
equation (2), the direction of selection acting upon a character of interest is given 
by least-squares the regression (slope) of relative fitness on the genetic value of the 
 character ( βw/w,g). The basis of the kin selection approach is the understanding that 
fitness may be mediated both by genes in the focal individual (g) and also by genes in 
that individual’s social partners (g´), and the least-squares regression can be partitioned 
so as to describe the partial effects of both sets of genes: 
βw/w,g = βw/w,g·g´ + βw/w,g´g = βg´g
The partial effect of the genes in the focal individual on its own fitness, holding fixed 
the effect of the genes in its social partners, is βw/w,g·g´ = – c, the personal cost of the 
social behaviour. The partial effect of the genes in social partners, holding fixed the 
effect of the focal individual’s genes, is βw/w,g´·g = b, the benefit of being a recipient of 
social behaviour. Finally, the genetic association between social partners is βg´g= r, the 
kin selection coefficient of genetic relatedness. Thus, the condition for the behaviour 
to be favoured (βw/w,g > 0) yields Hamilton’s rule: rb – c > 0. This derivation has taken 
the ‘neighbour-modulated fitness’ approach to kin selection, where b is interpreted as 
the impact of social partners upon the reproductive success of the focal individual. An 
alternative but equivalent approach is the inclusive fitness view, where b is interpreted 
as the impact of the focal individual on the reproductive success of its social partners; 
the two approaches always yield the same result.
The group selection approach to social evolution begins by considering that the entities 
in the parent and offspring populations are social groups rather than individual organ-
isms. For clarity, we index groups i ∈ I  and individuals within groups j J∈ . The Price 
equation describes the change in additive genetic value of the character as:
∆ ∆ g = w /w,g  + w /w gI i i I i icov ( ) E (( ) )
that is, a sum of group selection and group transmission effects. Note that the 
 transmission effect from parental group i to its offspring (∆gi) is similar in form to the 
change between the parent and offspring populations as a whole (∆g ). This means that 
we can write a lower-level Price equation to describe the change within social groups 
that mirrors the change within whole populations. Neglecting individual transmission 
effects, and substituting the lower level Price equation into the higher-level Price 
 equation, we have:
∆ g = w /w,g  + w /w w /w ,g .I i i I i J ij i ijcov ( ) E (( )cov ( ))
The right-hand side has partitioned the net selection on the trait into separate between-
group selection (first term) and within-group selection (second term) components. 
Thus, it provides an explicit mathematical definition of group selection and shows that 
change in the evolutionary character is neither wholly determined by selection within 
groups nor selection between groups, but a mixture of both. In some situations group 
selection may be strong enough to overpower the effects of within group selection and 
allow the evolution of characters that are disfavoured within groups.
Mathematical manipulation reveals that the sum of between-group selection and 
within-group selection is simply cov(wij/w,gij), the usual individual level selection 
expression of equation (2) that summarises the combined effects of selection at the 
between and within group levels. Since this single selection covariance is the basis of 
Hamilton’s rule, the group selection and kin selection approaches are mathematically 
equivalent.
Current Biology Vol 18 No 5
R202
travel in individual group members. 
We conducted a series of playback 
experiments with free-ranging 
putty-nosed monkeys at Gashaka 
Gumti National Park, Nigeria. In 
a first experiment, we observed 
the behavior of the females of a 
habituated group in response to 
playbacks of natural call series of 
their own male. A female could serve 
as focal subject if she was located 
at the periphery of the group while 
the male was at the opposite side, 
hereby ensuring that the male’s calls 
emanated from the correct direction. 
Playback trials consisted of five 
‘hacks’, five ‘pyows’ or a five-call 
P–H sequence. Using a GPS unit, the 
focal female’s location was marked 
prior to and 20 min after playback, 
while her behavior was monitored 
continuously. 
Our results showed that playback 
of ‘hack’ series (usually indicating 
eagle presence) inhibited movement 
in females (median = 1.0 m) and 
Meaningful call 
combinations in a 
non-human primate
Kate Arnold and Klaus Zuberbühler
Human speech is based on 
rule-governed assemblage of 
morphemes into more complex 
vocal expressions. Free- ranging 
putty- nosed monkeys 
(Cercopithecus nictitans) provide 
an interesting analogy, because 
males combine two loud alarm calls, 
‘hacks’ and ‘pyows’, into different 
call series depending on external 
events [1]. Series consisting of 
‘pyows’ are a common response to 
leopards, while ‘hacks’ or ‘hacks’ 
followed by ‘pyows’ are regularly 
given to crowned eagles [2,3]. 
Sometimes, males produce a further 
sequence, consisting of 1–4 ‘pyows’ 
followed by 1–4 ‘hacks’. These 
‘pyow–hack’ (P–H) sequences can 
occur alone, or they are inserted 
at or near the beginning of another 
call series. Regardless of context, 
P–H sequences reliably predict 
forthcoming group progression [4]. 
In playback experiments, we tested 
the monkeys’ reactions to ‘pyows’, 
‘hacks’ and P–H sequences and 
found that responses matched the 
natural conditions. Specifically, 
females started group progressions 
after hearing P–H sequences and 
responded appropriately to the other 
call series. In a second experiment, 
we tested artificially composed P–H 
sequences, and found that they 
were also effective in eliciting group 
progressions. In a third experiment, 
we established that group movement 
could only be triggered by the calls 
of the group’s own male, not those 
of a stranger. We conclude that, in 
this primate, meaning is encoded by 
call sequences, not individual calls. 
Many birds and primates are limited 
by small vocal repertoires [5,6], and 
this constraint may have favored 
the evolution of such combinatorial 
signaling.
We designed playback 
experiments to investigate whether 
P–H sequences given by a male are 
causally responsible for eliciting 
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Figure 1. Median distance traveled (A) and 
median latency to travel (B) after hear-
ing playbacks of different call series by the 
group’s male: ‘pyow’ series, ‘hack’ series, 
natural P–H sequences (P–H), and artificially 
composed P–H sequences (Synth P–H). 
Box plots indicate medians, inter-quartiles 
and ranges; outliers are indicated by open 
circles.indeed he played the major role in its 
development. But the idea originated 
with Price, in an unpublished 
manuscript that Maynard Smith had 
reviewed for Nature. Maynard Smith 
later explained that “Dr Price is better 
at having ideas than at publishing 
them. The best I can do therefore is to 
acknowledge that if there is anything 
in the idea the credit should go to  
Dr Price and not to me”.
Price’s inability to focus on 
publishing his theoretical insights 
was due to a sudden religious 
experience in the summer of 1970 
and a shift of priorities in his life. It 
is not known what in particular led 
Price, formerly a hardline atheist, 
down this avenue, although he did 
mention to Hamilton that a series 
of coincidences had forced him 
to conclude that God existed. He 
came to regard his equation as a gift 
from God and, taking a very literal 
interpretation of the New Testament, 
gave up science in order to dedicate 
his life to altruism. He sheltered the 
homeless in his flat, and gave away 
all his money and possessions to the 
poor and needy, and his life spiralled 
out of control. He became deeply 
depressed shortly after Christmas 
of 1974, and was found dead in his 
squatter’s tenement on the 6th of 
January 1975. He had cut his throat 
with nail scissors.
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